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Abstract. This paper contributes to the clarification of a design science epistemology. It
presents different epistemic types related to three stages of the design science process:
1) Evaluative and explanatory background knowledge (pre-design knowledge), 2) prospective knowledge with design hypotheses (in-design knowledge) and 3) prescriptive knowledge with design principles (post-design knowledge). The epistemological inquiry adopts
a pragmatist approach and is pursued through a review of design science literature and
informed by an empirical design case on digital support for social welfare allowances.
The clarified design science epistemology shows a diversified epistemological landscape
with several epistemic types: evaluative, critical, appreciative, normative, explanatory,
prospective, prescriptive, categorial and attributive knowledge. Ways to express these
epistemic types have been proposed in principal clauses. Ways of grounding have been
clarified for each epistemic type. Proposals are given on how to utilize the design science epistemology in relation to design science process models and publication schemas.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
After the articulation of design science (DS) as a legitimate research approach in information systems (March and Smith, 1995; Hevner et al, 2004), there has been a
growth of such kind of research. There existed, of course, design-oriented research in
information systems (IS) earlier, but those scholars framed their research in other ways.
Even after the labeling and promotion of the design science approach in IS, not all such
research studies self-identify themselves as design science. In an investigation of the use
of design science in digital government, Fedorowicz and Dias (2010) identify that “few
digital government studies self-identify as belonging to this research paradigm; others
present their technological artifact as a case study without grounding in a common
methodology or design science framework or theory” (ibid. p. 6). There is no reason to
believe that this situation is restricted to digital government, but appears in many other
domains of IS research.
Following the seminal paper of Hevner et al (2004) there has been an intense work
conducted by IS scholars of filling the different gaps of this approach; for example
process descriptions (e.g.,Peffers et al. 2007), design theorizing (e.g.,Gregor and Jones
2007; Lee et al. 2011), evaluation principles and methods (e.g.,Sonnenberg and vom
Brocke 2012; Prat et al. 2015; Venable et al. 2016), relations to similar approaches
such as action research (Sein et al. 2011), how to write a DS paper (Gregor and Hevner
2013). There have also been discussions about the paradigmatic roots of design science.
Most scholars identify the scientific foundations to come from the seminal work of
“the sciences of the artificial” (Simon 1996) and “the science of design” (a chapter in
Simon 1996; reprinted as Simon 1988). This means a science of the artificially designed
as opposed to a science of the naturally given. Paradigmatic analyses of the ontology,
epistemology, and methodology of design science have been conducted by Gregg et
al. (2001), Purao (2002) and Iivari (2007), although these do not make any clear positioning within an established research paradigm. There exist however proposals how
to position DS paradigmatically. Niehaves (2007) attempts to position DS within an
interpretivist paradigm. Carlsson (2010) attempts to position DS within critical realism. There are several proposals to position DS within a pragmatist paradigm (Hevner
et al. 2004; Hevner 2007; Cole et al. 2005; Lee and Nickerson 2010; Goldkuhl 2012ab;
Ågerfalk and Wiberg 2018). There exists obviously no consensus within the IS research
community about paradigmatic foundations of design science. There exist of course
many challenges in DS concerning the practical conduct of designing, since these tasks
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are demanding as they require imaginative and technical skills. Besides this, design
science seems to comprise great challenges and uncertainties concerning its epistemological character. There are uncertainties of what kind of outcomes from DS that is
mandatory or just optional. There exist different opinions and claims concerning design
science outcomes: A useful artifact, design principles, design theory or kernel theory
improvement.
Design science has been contrasted to ‘behavioral science’ (Hevner et al. 2004). The
forerunner of that paper (i.e.,March and Smith 1995) used the corresponding notion
of natural science. Classical behavioral science is concerned with what-is, i.e.,giving
truthful and abstracted accounts of an already existing world. Such an approach produces results (descriptions, explanations) that are epistemologically well established. The
idea of DS is to work with what-might-be instead of what-is. The outcomes of design
science do not have such a clear epistemological character as behavioral science. Hevner
et al. (2004) claim that the corresponding function in DS is utility, instead of truth as
it appears in behavioral science. This claim is however about the artifact, which is not
an epistemic claim as a truth claim is.
There are several contributions describing the nature of design theory as being prescriptive (Walls et al. 1992; Kuechler and Vaishnavi 2012). Is it so simple that behavioral science operates within epistemic functions of descriptive and explanatory character
and design science within prescriptive functions? These epistemological issues need to
be further addressed. The need for such efforts is well argued by two of the main actors
within the IS DS movement, Gregor and Hevner (2013) who state: “We contend that
ongoing confusion and misunderstandings of DSR’s central ideas and goals are hindering DSR from having a more striking influence on the IS field. A key problem that
underlies this confusion is less than full understanding of how DSR relates to human
knowledge.” (ibid. p. 338). It is of great importance that IS scholars engaging in design
science are aware of fundamental epistemological challenges and discourses in order to
avoid naïve and dubious knowledge contributions. Hovorka (2010, p. 24) writes: “To
assume-away or to simply ignore the significant debates surrounding the production
and validation of knowledge would be a disservice to design science research and reduce
its validity as a process of knowledge creation”. Barquet et al. (2017, p. 398) have also
identified a “relative absence of established ways to develop and communicate knowledge contributions from design-oriented research within information systems”. Confer
also Niehaves (2007) and Baskerville et al. (2015) about needs for further epistemological clarifications.
There is thus an obvious need for clarification of knowledge types in design science studies. A continued epistemological confusion among DS scholars may obstruct
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an effective execution of DS studies as well as scholarly discourses on methodological
principles. A goal is to have DS researchers well equipped with a set of clearly defined
knowledge types in design science.
A note on terminology is needed; what to call this kind of research where design efforts play a decisive role? The terminology is not yet settled and stable in IS and neither
outside IS. In IS, there exist labels such as “system development research” (Nunamaker
et al. 1991), “design-oriented research” (Barquet et al. 2017; Niehaves 2007; Sjöström
and Ågerfalk 2009), “design research” (Cole et al. 2005; Hevner and Chatterjee 2010;
Purao 2002), “design science” (Hevner et al. 2004; Iivari 2007; Johannesson and Perjons
2014; Niehaves, 2007), “design science research” (Gregor and Hevner 2013; Hevner et
al. 2004; Kuechler and Vaishnavi 2012). Some examples of shifting terminology outside IS are: “research through design” in HCI (Zimmerman and Forlizzi 2014), “design
science” in management (van Aken 2004); “design-oriented research” in research methodology (Verschuren and Hartog 2005). I have chosen to use the succinct label ‘design
science’ through this text. This seems also be in accordance with the programmatic
statement by Simon (1988; 1996) about the “science of design”.

1.2 Purpose and focus
There is a need for an inquiry into the epistemology of design science. Epistemology
is concerned with the nature of knowledge, its sources, and justification (Steup 2018).
How should we epistemologically characterize the knowledge contributions from design science? The purpose of this paper is to conduct an inquiry into design science
epistemology (DSE) in order to arrive at a systematized and more exhaustive account of
knowledge contributions that are made within and from design science studies and the
inherent epistemic types of such knowledge contributions. The aim is thus to contribute to a re-conceptualization of design science knowledge contributions by exploring its
epistemic functions; i.e.,to arrive at a useful classification of epistemic types in design
science studies. Why is this important? The idea of clarifying design science epistemology is 1) to further enhance our understanding of this kind of emergent research
approach within IS and 2) to give DS scholars a firm base for conducting and gauging
IS DS concerning what kinds of epistemic claims that can and should be raised concerning such research.
Design science in IS can be performed concerning different kinds of artifacts. March
and Smith (1995) stated that four kinds of DS outcomes could be designed and studied
in design science (constructs, methods, models, instantiations). It is clear that a DS
approach has been used in IS research for a magnitude of artifacts and design objects.
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Knowledge is needed for how to conduct design research for different types of artifacts.
This presented paper will have a clear focus on the development of IT artifacts, IS artifacts, digital artifacts or whatever we call this core phenomenon of IS research. An IT
artifact, as being a socio-technical artifact (Silver and Markus 2013), is always embedded in a social practice context (Orlikowski and Iacono 2001). The design and study of
such artifacts need to take into account its social practice context. The primary focus,
in this paper, is thus IT artifacts as designed objects and the epistemology concerned
with this. This means a focus on design as product. This entails also an interest in the
epistemic logic of the design process.
This focus has been chosen since it seems most urgent to deal with these epistemological matters for IS design science. It is also important not to blur results from this
epistemological inquiry with other possible design objects (as methods and models).
Future research should investigate epistemological issues for those other types of artifacts. The presented research here can be one possible source for such research.

2 Research approach
2.1 A pragmatist inquiry on epistemology
This research has been conducted through an inquiry. This notion is here used in its
pragmatist sense (Dewey 1910; 1938; Thayer 1981; Cronen 2001). An inquiry starts
with the experience of an indeterminate and problematic situation and it ends with a
transformed situation into a determinate one. This transformation, of an initial problematic situation into a settled and determinate one, passes through different inquiry
stages; problem formulation, proposal formulation, abstract reasoning and testing of
proposals (ibid.). The research aim is to arrive at an improved conceptualization of design science epistemology. This means that a conceptual analysis is needed. Prominent
design science literature is investigated with an epistemological perspective. The DS
literature is studied concerning different knowledge items with the purpose to make
their epistemic types explicit.
The inquiry is not restricted to literature analysis and conceptual refinement. The
DSE conceptualization has emerged through an alternation between conceptual analysis and empirical work. This author has experiences from several design science studies
(Sjöström and Goldkuhl 2009; Goldkuhl and Lind 2010; Goldkuhl 2011; Goldkuhl
2012a; Eriksson and Goldkuhl 2013; Goldkuhl et al. 2015; Goldkuhl 2016). These DS
experiences have of course influenced the emergence of this epistemological conceptu-
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alization. One empirical case of design research has been selected for use in this paper.
This case has been used as an important vehicle in this inquiry. It has been used in a
generative fashion for analysis, illustration, and formulation of design science epistemic
types. This case has also been used as a means for testing the adequacy and applicability
of the proposed DS epistemic types.

2.2 Epistemic type
The central concept in this inquiry is epistemic type. Different possible knowledge items
within design science are epistemologically characterized, i.e.,different epistemic types
are assigned to the identified DS knowledge items. This work with epistemic types is
mainly inspired by the communicative action theory of Habermas (1984). This theory
builds on a rational view of knowledge and its validity. To claim the validity of knowledge means that good reasons as arguments are presented in order to make the knowledge trustworthy and adequate.
Habermas (1984) states in an explicit way that different character of knowledge
(expressed in different forms of sentences) requires different validity claims or forms of
grounding. ”Starting from the analysis of sentence forms, we can go on to clarify the
semantic conditions under which corresponding sentence is valid. …. [T]he meaning
of grounding changes in specific ways with changes in sentence form.” (ibid. p. 39).
This can be illustrated by the difference between a description and a prescription. Concerning descriptions, the main validity claim is truth. A description is valued if it is true
or not. A valid description is a true one. A prescription is not valued concerning truth
claims. Instead, it is valued concerning appropriateness. This is the case since descriptions and prescriptions are of different epistemic types. The epistemic character of a
description (as a sentence) is that it gives a correct account of something that exists. The
epistemic type of a prescription (as a sentence) is that it gives a useful recommendation
for creating something to become.
Habermas’ theory is harmonious with the pragmatist stance of this inquiry. Expressing sentences (as knowledge representations) are seen as communicative actions. This
is also the case concerning explicit validity claims of such sentences/communicative
actions. Such validity claims can be seen as meta-discursive actions.

2.3 Structure
The inquiry on DSE is presented in the following according to this disposition: The
problematic situation and the need for inquiry (the research question) have been presented in the initial section above (1). After the elaboration of research approach in
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this section (2), it follows in the next section (3) an epistemological analysis of design
science literature. This analysis leads to a conceptualization of an epistemic logic of the design science process and a preliminary list of epistemic types in design science. The following
section (4) presents and investigates an empirical design case (digital transfer in social
welfare allowances). The author has first-hand experience from this case. The case illustrates different epistemic types of knowledge items related to the identified epistemic
logic of the design science process. Based on the literature analysis and the empirical
case analysis, a coherent conceptualization of DSE is presented in the following section
(5). This fulfills the transformation into a settled and determinate situation of the inquiry. The paper ends with discussion and conclusions (6). In this concluding section,
possible uses of this design science epistemology are discussed.

3 Assumed epistemic types in design science
3.1 Design science process and knowledge creation
Hevner et al. (2004) describe design science in a fairly simple way to consist of
build-evaluate cycles. This condensed view has been expanded by several other scholars
into different process models. Kuechler and Vaishnavi (2012) have expanded the build
phase into three (iterative) stages: 1) problem awareness, 2) suggestion and 3) development. A similar model is found in Peffers et al. (2007). In their model, there is an
explicit stage on “define objectives of a solution” after the problem formulation stage.
Several scholars have explored the role and constituents of evaluation in DS. Venable et al. (2016) have presented a framework for evaluation in design science. They distinguish between 1) why to evaluate, 2) what to evaluate, 3) when to evaluate (ex-ante
or ex-post), and 4) how to evaluate (in artificial or naturalistic settings). The temporal
dimension has been further elaborated by Sonnenberg and vom Brocke (2012). They
identify four different evaluation points in the design science process: 1) before design
which means an evaluation of the problematic situation, 2) after design, but before
construction, 3) after construction but before use (e.g.,through the use of prototypes)
and 4) after use in its practice context. There are several suggestions in the literature
concerning criteria for evaluation. General criteria for evaluating the IT artifact (instantiation) are suggested by March and Smith (1995, p. 261), “efficiency and effectiveness
of the artifact and its impact on the environment and its users” and Hevner et al. (2004,
p. 85), “utility, quality, and efficacy of a design artifact”. One important insight, accounted for above, was the conduct of evaluation in different stages of the DS process.
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Sonnenberg and vom Brocke (2012) and Verschuren and Hartog (2005) differentiate
and relate criteria to different stage-types of evaluation. Confer also Prat et al. (2015)
and Baskerville et al. (2015). One important conclusion from reading the literature on
design science evaluation is that there are criteria expressing values both concerning
the artifact and the use-context. We can speak of artifact-centric criteria and user/usage-centric criteria. However, sometimes these distinctions are blurred.

3.2 Knowledge abstraction in design science
The main outcome from design science in IS is considered to be an artifact following
Hevner et al. (2004): “The result of design-science research in IS is, by definition, a
purposeful IT artifact created to address an important organizational problem” (ibid.
p. 82). In their seminal paper, there is a reluctance to include theories and other abstractions as results from DS; a position that has been softened in later publications
(e.g.,Gregor and Hevner 2013).
Many scholars have advocated for a DS process characterized by different levels
of abstractness. The DS knowledge development is often characterized by alternating
between two layers of abstractness, although the labels are differing, as “abstract knowledge” vs. “concrete knowledge” (Sjöström and Ågerfalk 2009); “abstract knowledge” vs.
“situational knowledge” (Goldkuhl and Lind 2010; Barquet et al. 2017); “abstract domain” vs. “instance domain” (Lee et al. 2011); “generic artifacts” vs. “situated artifacts”
(Winter 2014); “nomothetic knowledge” vs. “idiographic knowledge” (Baskerville et al.
2015). It is clear in some of these publications, indicated in others, that the DS process
is characterized by a continual movement back-and-forth between an abstract knowledge layer and a concrete/situational layer. This implies also the generation of intermediary knowledge as well as final DS knowledge contributions. Knowledge elements
within DS can be 1) utilized (as exterior input), 2) generated and used as intermediaries
within the DS process, and 3) generated as final outcomes from the DS endeavor.

3.3 Design theory and epistemic types
Design theory is considered, by several scholars, to be a main outcome from a design
science endeavor. There are several contributions concerning constituents and structure
of design theory. A pioneer contribution was made by Walls et al. (1992). A design
theory is seen as a prescriptive theory integrating explanatory, predictive and normative
knowledge (ibid.). The explanatory part of the theory is made up of so-called kernel
theories, i.e.,background theories that could inform the prescriptive parts of the theory.
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This means that other theories may be imported and integrated into the proposed design theory. A design theory comprises prescriptive knowledge for both design process
and design product. The prescriptive essence of the design theory for the design product
consists of meta-requirements, as “a class of goals”, and “meta-design”, as “a class of
artifacts meeting the meta-requirements” (ibid. p. 42).
The relationships between explanatory knowledge and prescriptive knowledge in
design theories were more thoroughly described by Goldkuhl (2004). An explanatory
statement (of cause-to-effect type) can be transformed into a prescriptive statement
(of means-to-end type) if the effect is considered to be desirable, i.e.,a goal. Goldkuhl
(2004) emphasizes a multi-grounding approach to design theory; besides 1) an empirical grounding there should be 2) an internal grounding and 3) a theoretical grounding
consisting of explanatory, normative (value) and conceptual grounding. The relationships and integration of conceptual, explanatory, normative and prescriptive knowledge
in design theories are thus made explicit by Goldkuhl (2004). Kuechler and Vaishnavi (2012) build on Walls et al. (1992) and Goldkuhl (2004) when developing their
framework for theory development in IS design science. They claim the importance of
translating and adapting explanatory kernel theories to the specific circumstances of IS
design (design relevant explanatory/predictive theory). Besides formal kernel theories,
they also want to include tacit knowledge (experiences and insights) as a basis for the
generation of design theory.
The importance to include explanatory background knowledge (kernel theories)
is also emphasized by Gregor and Jones (2007). In their work on the anatomy of an
IS design theory they include “justificatory knowledge” (equivalent to kernel theory)
as a basis for proposed prescriptions. Gregor and Jones (2007) have transformed and
expanded the Walls et al. (1992) design theory approach. Instead of “meta-requirements”, Gregor and Jones speak of “purpose and scope of the system” and instead of
“meta-design”, they speak of “principle of form and function as an abstract ‘blueprint’
or architecture that describes an IS artifact” (ibid. p. 322). They have also provided additional elements to a design theory. The key constructs (entities of interest) have been
made explicit. Anticipated state changes of an artifact (artifact mutability) have also
been added.
Winter (2014) has also made a contribution to design theorizing, where he emphasizes the distinction between descriptive (explanatory) and prescriptive knowledge.
Although it is easy to agree with this difference analytically, it seems that this author
over-emphasizes such a difference. “It should be carefully differentiated whether ‘theory-type’ statements relate cause and effect (explanatory and/or predictive theory) or
relate means and end (design theory). This line separates two ‘worlds’, the world of
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descriptive artifacts and the world of prescriptive artifacts.” (ibid. p. 5). As stated above,
the difference between cause-to-effect and means-to-end lies in whether the effect is
considered as a desired state (an end).
In a review of different design theory anatomies, like Walls et al. (1992) and Gregor
and Jones (2007), Baskerville and Pries-Heje (2010) claim that these approaches are
“overly complicated” (ibid. p. 271). As a reaction to this, they propose that design theories should be divided into two distinct classes; 1) design practice theory and 2) design
theory of design objects. The latter should be reduced to just consist of explanatory
statements. These are described to be functional explanations stating relations between
object features and requirements. However, their conceptualization of requirements
seems to differ from Walls et al. (1992). They speak of “capability or conditions …
possessed by a system” (Baskerville and Pries-Heje 2010, p. 274). It seems to be a focus
on the means, and the ends (goals) are somewhat implied; “… needed by a user to solve
a problem or achieve an objective” (ibid.). This type of explanatory clause of Baskerville
and Pries-Heje (2010) has been further investigated by Niehaves and Ortbach (2016),
where they emphasize the potential existence of multi-causality relationships between
independent and dependent variables.
A similar design theory approach can be found in Venable (2006) who speaks of
utility functions between 1) technological solutions and 2) business needs for problem
resolution. Instead of explanations or prescriptions, he characterizes this theoretical
knowledge to be predictive. Baskerville and Pries-Heje (2010) emphasize their similar
theoretical clause to be explanatory but acknowledge its nature of being constructive
and prescriptive as well. This is fully in line with the accounts in Goldkuhl (2004) and
Kuechler and Vaishnavi (2012).
Not all design abstractions are made in the form of a complete design theory. Gregor
and Hevner (2013) talk about nascent design theories that can consist of “constructs,
methods, models, design principles, technological rules” (ibid. p. 342). The Action Design Research approach of Sein et al. (2011) explicitly uses the notion of design principle
as an outcome of applying their approach. They do not present a clear definition of a
design principle (although claiming it to represent design knowledge), but when studying their empirical case a clear pattern arises. A design principle is seen as some specific
feature of an artifact and it can be related to desired (and sometimes unanticipated and
undesired) consequences among users. They speak of the need for “an assessment of the
artifact and design principles that it represents” (ibid. p. 42). There are other prescriptive knowledge contributions expressed in the DS literature. Dwiwedi et al. (2014) have
made a literature review and have identified different types of DS knowledge contributions. Many of these seem to be of prescriptive nature (guideline, design principle,
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design pattern, design requirement, design recommendation, generative mechanism),
however not yet matured to an explicit design theory level.
What epistemic types are assumed in the above reviewed design theory approaches? Most approaches claim the role of design theory to be prescriptive. There are however differences between how elements of prescriptive statements are conceptualized
and labeled. Explanatory knowledge is also included in these design theory types; 1)
sometimes as externally provided background theories (kernel theories), 2) sometimes
as transformed and adapted background knowledge and 3) sometimes as explanatory
equivalents of stated prescriptions or predictions. Value knowledge is explicitly included
in some design theory approaches, but given different labels (meta-requirement, goal,
purpose). In other approaches, it is rather kept implicit. The importance to stress key
concepts in design theory is made by Goldkuhl (2004), “conceptual grounding”, Gregor
and Jones (2007), “constructs as entities of interest” and Winter (2014), “foundational
constructs”. Confer also the DS knowledge type “definitional knowledge” by Johannesson and Perjons (2014). This type of knowledge will be called categorial knowledge in
the following.

3.4 An epistemic logic of the design science process
Design theory is seen as a fundamental outcome of DS research. Different epistemic
functions of design theory have been indicated above. But, how about other types of
knowledge in the DS process? Evaluation is not only used, as described above, for a
final and summative evaluation of an IT artifact in use with the purpose of validating
design theory. There are formative uses of evaluation during the DS process in order to
improve knowledge concerning design. Evaluation plays generative roles in the design
process when contributing with knowledge to direct the design in fruitful paths. As can
be derived from DS process descriptions (e.g.,Peffers et al. 2007; Kuechler and Vaishnavi 2012) there are several knowledge contributions made in the design process. For
example, there is knowledge about problematic situations, about objectives and values,
and also about proposals for design. There may be evaluations made with reference to
these different situations and objects.
Design science has been characterized as concerned with knowledge about a worldto-be as contrasted with a world-as-is. This is only partially true. Design science starts
with a world-as-is (comprising its deficiencies and unexplored opportunities) and tries
to transform it into a desirable world-to-be. Knowledge about the world-as-is is fundamental for the DS process. Such knowledge is however not a strictly neutral description
of prevailing circumstances. The knowledge about current practices is based on implicit
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or explicit assessments. Several DS scholars state that problem formulation is the starting point of DS (Hevner et al. 2004; Peffers et al. 2007; Sein et al. 2011). Knowledge
about problems and current practices forms a fundamental background knowledge for
the design process in DS. This kind of knowledge is descriptive, but a more appropriate
epistemic characterization is to state that it is evaluative knowledge. Problems aren’t just
there. They depend on human assessments of current affairs. This is an initial stage in
all kinds of inquiries, triggered by experiences of difficulties and disturbances, and trying to find out “what works” and “what does not work” (Dewey 1910; 1938). More or
less explicit in this evaluation and problem investigation are the values and goals of the
practices. Problems and difficulties exist as deviations from what is desired.
Besides such a situational knowledge, there may also be an influence from extant
abstract knowledge with relevance for the design topic; i.e.,what is called kernel theory
by several scholars; cf. discussion above. Kernel theory is not generated within the DS
process, but it is selected and furnished to the knowledge process and it is, therefore,
pertinent to include it in an epistemological analysis.
Design science is about a possible world; a world that might come into existence.
Fundamentally in IS design science is ideas about 1) better IT artifacts and 2) that
these artifacts will improve human practices. The ideational character of DS needs to
be accounted for. Artifact ideas are suggestions and proposals, which are continually
developed and shaped during the design process. This ideational knowledge can be epistemologically characterized as prospective knowledge; i.e.,knowledge about the possible.
The world-to-be is, however, not only a possible world. It is also a desirable world, which
accounts for normative knowledge of goals and values.
Design science is not only about creating ideas about a future situation. It tries
through building and intervention to create such future states; i.e.,designed artifacts
and improved practices. After arriving at these new states, the corresponding knowledge
about these changes needs to be articulated. Sometimes it is said that it is sufficient
with a designed artifact as the result from DS research; a so-called proof-of-concept
(Nunamaker et al. 2015). The artifact encapsulates knowledge about itself. However, from a scientific perspective, this knowledge needs to be extracted and justified in
separate scholarly descriptions. Descriptions of artifacts and their use-effects should be
articulated in the form of design principles or design theories. Such accounts can be
said to function as prescriptive knowledge (Goldkuhl 2004; van Aken 2004); i.e.,how
should we act in design (what artifact properties to strive for) in order to reach certain
goals (improved states in use-practices).
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An epistemic logic of the design science process can be formulated as a result of this
analysis. Three stages can be identified with their respective knowledge types. This is
summarized in table 1.
Design science process
stage
Pre-design

Kind of knowledge

Epistemic type

1) Situational knowledge about

1) Evaluative background

problems and practice context

knowledge

2) Abstract extant knowledge

2) Explanatory background

selected for potential use

knowledge

Corresponding
world state

World-as-is

(kernel theory)
In-design

Ideas and proposals;

Prospective and normative

World-as-might-

values and goals

knowledge

be

Post-design

Knowledge about artifact

Prescriptive knowledge

World-as-become

(=use)

properties with related impact

and world-to-

on use-situations

become

Table 1. Types of knowledge and related world-states in the design science process

This epistemic logic of the design science process will be illustrated in the empirical
case description below (section 4) and further elaborated in the clarified design science
epistemology (section 5).

3.5 A preliminary list of epistemic types
This epistemological analysis of the design science literature has identified several different epistemic types. Table 1 describes three phases of the design science process and
their associated main knowledge types. There are, however, more knowledge types identified through the epistemological analysis above. The following epistemic types have
been identified and these will be furthered as candidates for the DS epistemological
classification to come (section 5 below): Explanatory knowledge, predictive knowledge,
normative knowledge, prescriptive knowledge, categorial knowledge, evaluative knowledge, and prospective knowledge.
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4 An empirical design case: Digital transfer in social
welfare allowances
In order to clarify different epistemological issues in IS design science, parts of an empirical DS case will be used. There will be no comprehensive description of this case.
More detailed accounts of results have been presented elsewhere (Goldkuhl 2012a;
Eriksson and Goldkuhl 2013; Goldkuhl 2016). The case description is not used to
present a comprehensive process description or resulting design theory. The aim of this
case description is to use it in an appropriate way for this inquiry on DS epistemology.
The purpose of this case presentation is to empirically illustrate and analyze knowledge items of a design science process in order to state different epistemic types. The
design case is concerned with digital transfer in social welfare allowances. The author
has participated in a longitudinal e-government development concerning social welfare
allowances. This project can be characterized as combined action research and design
research.

4.1 Evaluation of current situation
A short presentation of the workpractice and its digital development follows: The responsibility for social welfare allowances resides within welfare boards of municipalities.
People with severe problems to make a living can apply for social welfare allowances.
It is necessary for municipal welfare officers to check the total economic situation (including other allowances) for an applicant. A social welfare officer needs to contact
different national agencies and inquire if other allowances are given to the client. In
the design project, we developed a multi-query application that digitally sends queries
to several national agencies (e.g.,the Social Insurance Agency and the Board for Study
Support). Immediate answers are obtained digitally and they are exposed to the social
welfare officers in the multi-query application. This communication was earlier mainly
conducted through telephone calls and for a minority of authorities through a slow
batch query application.
The development of new IT artifacts started from problematic situations in the case
handling of social welfare allowances. It was confirmed that sometimes erroneous decisions were made by the social welfare boards concerning social welfare allowances. It
could be in either way; the clients could get too much money or too little. The clients
should in their applications for social welfare allowances state all relevant economic
information (that contained already given allowances of other kinds). The important
task of the social welfare officers was to check the validity of this information. She (in
most cases it was a female) needed to contact several national agencies to check the
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figures. This was a cumbersome work. There were many different types of allowances to
keep in mind and to check for the social welfare officer. It took a lot of time to collect
and check all relevant information since this was made mainly through telephone calls.
It was experienced as difficult to collect this information, which had the consequence
that some relevant information might be missed. The consequence could be a lack of
information as a decision basis. The oral transfer of information over the telephone was
not considered safe. Sometimes misunderstandings could occur concerning allowances,
periods and amounts. The consequence could be erroneous information as a decision
basis. This could be the case if the applicants had submitted (unwittingly or intentionally) erroneous information and the social welfare officer had not checked its validity.
The social welfare officers complained that it took so much time to collect and check
the information for the applicants. This paperwork hindered them to interact with the
clients and give them support in their vulnerable situations. The social welfare officers
wanted to have more time to work directly with the clients in helpful ways.
The insecure and cumbersome situation with information collection and transfer
did not only result in information shortage and information error. It could also, in
some instances, lead to information surplus. It was hard for the case handlers at the national agencies, in stressful telephone calls, to check the authorization of the municipal
officers to retrieve personal information about clients. There was an obvious risk that
too much information was delivered in relation to privacy regulations. This problem
analysis has been summarized in table 2 expressing cause-effect relationships. What is
characterized as a cause can be reasons for action, i.e.,a kind of teleological explanation.
This problem analysis was based on certain apprehended values in the different
workpractices. An articulation of goals as a basis for the design was made. They can be
summarized as follows:
•
•
•
•

Efficient social welfare case handling
Correct decisions on social welfare allowances
(Time for) adequate support to social welfare clients
Privacy in social welfare case handling (avoidance of information surplus)

It had been legislative obstacles for an efficient digital transfer of information in the
social welfare sector due to restrictive privacy concerns. A new statute had however been
issued that gave better possibilities for a direct digital transfer of specified information
about clients from national agencies to municipalities. This opened a window for a new
digital design that was exploited in this research project.
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Cause

Effect

Erroneous information about clients and/or lack

Erroneous social welfare allowance decisions.

of information about clients.
No information submitted by clients and no

Lack of information about clients (information

collection of client information is made from

shortage).

national agencies.
Cumbersome and time-consuming to collect

No collection of client information is made from

client information and/or many other allowances

national agencies.

to keep in mind and check.
Misunderstandings in telephone communication

Erroneous information about clients.

between the municipality and national agency
and/or client have submitted erroneous
information (on purpose or by mistake).
Cumbersome and time-consuming to collect

Lack of time for social welfare officers to work

client information.

with direct support to clients.

Hard to check authorization during stressful

Information given to officers without

telephone calls.

authorization (information surplus).

Table 2. Problem statements as cause-effect relationships

This legislative change was a new strength in the workpractice. The analysis of what-is
was not only based on a problem investigation. A kind of appreciative inquiry was also
performed. The following strengths of the governmental practices were identified:
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• New legislation that permits an immediate digital transfer of client information
from national agencies to municipalities
• There existed digital resources (registers) at the national agencies that contained
relevant information about clients for case handling of social welfare allowances
• Committed social welfare officers with ambitions to give proper support to social
welfare clients
It was important in the DS study to obtain a deep understanding of the current practice
as a basis for the design of new IT artifacts. As can be seen above, this evaluation of
current practice included investigations of problems, goals, and strengths.

4.2 Design of new IT artifacts
A new digital solution was developed consisting of several interoperating IT artifacts. As
said above, a multi-query application was developed for the social welfare departments
in municipalities. This IT artifact is used by social welfare officers to send queries to all
relevant national agencies for the collection of economic information about applicants.
The resulting answers are presented in a well-structured way in a user-interface, which
is easy to navigate between overview and many details. This digital solution was developed according to the new legislation. The digital transfer of information was restricted
to those items explicitly mentioned in the new statute. However, the Data Inspection
Board complained that the digital solution was not secure enough. It is stated in the
regulations that there must be an open welfare case and that there should be technical
obstacles to state queries concerning other persons. A new solution was designed as a
result of these complaints. The multi-query application was furnished with new functionality. After this change, the software application could check that there was an open
welfare case by reading the database of the social welfare case system. Only after this
check, it was possible to send a query to the national agencies.
In figure 1, there is a structured description of primary artifact functions and their
relations to workpractice goals. The artifact functions have been divided into 1) external properties (i.e.,functions directly related to users) and 2) conditional properties
(i.e.,internal or structural functions). External functions serve the users directly and
conditional functions influence the external functions of the artifact.
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Conditional artifact properties

Digital queries
are submitted
to all relevant
authorities

External artifact properties

Practice goals

Digital
answers are
given and
collected

Complete, valid
& well-structured
client information
is exposed

Correct
decision on
social welfare
allowances

Immediate
transferring of
answers

Client
information is
immediately
exposed

Efficient case
handling in
social welfare
Available time
for support to
clients

No
information
about other
persons is
exposed

Only queries
on open
cases can be
submitted

Privacy in
social welfare
case handling
is protected

Figure 1. Structured description of conditional and external properties of the IT artifacts, and
workpractice goals

5 Towards a clarified design science epistemology
5.1 Epistemic types in design science studies
The literature analysis produced a list of preliminary epistemic types (section 3.5):
explanatory knowledge, predictive knowledge, normative knowledge, prescriptive
knowledge, categorial knowledge, evaluative knowledge, and prospective knowledge.
The analysis of the empirical case in section 4 has added three epistemic types to this
list. Evaluative knowledge was developed in the DS case. There were studies of problems and strengths in the studied practice (see section 4.1). This means that evaluative
knowledge can be of two kinds; negative evaluations (problems) and positive evaluations (strengths). Evaluative knowledge that describes problems will be labeled critical
knowledge. Evaluative knowledge that describes strengths will be labeled appreciative
knowledge. The empirical analysis featured also properties of IT artifacts to be an important knowledge type. Different conditional and external properties of the IT artifact
were described (figure 1). The designed IT artifact is a central object in the DS study
(categorial knowledge), and this designed object appears with certain properties. The
knowledge of such (designed) properties will be called attributive knowledge. These three
types (critical knowledge, appreciative knowledge, attributive knowledge) are added to
the list of epistemic types from section 3.5. It seems that the investigated literature
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(section 3) was not sufficiently specific about such knowledge types. A juxtaposition of
these different epistemic types is made in table 3.
Table 3 lists the epistemic types (first column) and clarifies them through a principal
clause (second column) and illustrates them through examples from the social welfare
case (third column). This empirical illustration implies also that all epistemic types can
be said to exist in the empirical case.
Some more comments need to be done to the list in table 3. One epistemic type
(from the preliminary list in section 3.5) has been excluded: predictive knowledge. Predictions and explanations are considered of a similar epistemic kind. There is a common
clause-type of cause-to-effect for both these statements. I follow here the analysis of
theory construction made by Reynolds (1971). He equates explanation and prediction
in principle and states that the difference lies in temporality: “Predicting events that will
occur in the future and explaining events that have occurred in the past are, except for a
difference in temporal perspective, essentially the same activity as long as scientific statements are abstract” (ibid. p. 3; my emphasis). To this one can add, that an explanation
seems usually to be directed from a phenomenon (considered as an effect) to stating its
efficacious cause, and that a prediction seems usually to be directed from a phenomenon (considered as a cause) to stating its potential effect. There exist, however, scholars
in IS that differentiate between explanatory and predictive theories. Gregor (2006) sees
predictions as weaker than a strict causality. Predictions are statements that contain
“correlations between two variables [that] does not necessarily imply a causal relationship” (ibid. p. 626). It is, however, stated by the same author that “this type of theory in
IS do not come readily to hand, suggesting that they are not common” (ibid. p. 626).
My conclusion is, following Reynolds (1971), that we do not need predictive knowledge as a separate epistemic type in a design science epistemology. Predictive knowledge
is mainly covered by explanatory knowledge. It can also be covered by the special cases
of causal statements that are prospective knowledge (proposed and hypothetical meansto-end knowledge) and prescriptive knowledge (validated means-to-end knowledge).
The relationships between explanatory, prospective and prescriptive knowledge will be
explained in more detail in section 5.2.
A further comment on explanatory knowledge and causality is needed. In table
3, explanatory knowledge is defined through causality in the following way “stating
that something (=cause) influences/produces something (=effect)”. In an IS context,
this should not be interpreted always in a strict deterministic way. Depending on the
characters of phenomena, the relationship between the cause and its effect will vary.
In the social realm, there exist intentional and value-seeking human action and social
interaction based on affordances in instruments and interpretations of meaning (Blum-
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Type of
Knowledge

Principal clause

Example (from social welfare case)

Evaluative

Stating that something is assessed to

See examples of problems and strengths

knowledge

be in some way

Critical

Stating that something is considered

Cumbersome and time-consuming to collect

knowledge

to be negative (=problem)

client information about clients

Appreciative

Stating that something is considered

Committed social welfare officers with

knowledge

to be positive (=strength)

ambitions to give proper support to social
welfare clients

Normative

Stating that something is desirable

Correct decisions on social welfare

knowledge

(=goal)

allowances

Explanatory

Stating that something (=cause)

Lack of information about clients can give

knowledge

influences/produces something

erroneous social welfare allowances decisions

(=effect)
Prospective

Stating that something is possible

knowledge

Social welfare artifact with immediate
exposure of client information may
contribute to correct decisions on welfare
allowances

Prescriptive

Stating how to (=means) reach

Social welfare artifact with immediate

knowledge

something desirable (=end)

exposure of client information contributes
to correct decisions on welfare allowances

Categorial

Stating that something exists

Information about clients

Stating properties of something

Shortage of client information

knowledge
Attributive
knowledge

Table 3. Different epistemic types in design science explained through principal clauses and
illustrative examples
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er 1969; Gibson 1979; Habermas 1984; Winch 1990). This constitutes an efficacy
between conditions and effects with a softer socio-pragmatic causality. There might be
cases with a strict necessity between cause and effect as e.g.,the execution of software
code in a computing machine. There will be other cases involving human interpretation/action and social interaction where causes/conditions will influence/facilitate the
production of effects without any strict necessity. Such different forms of causality are
accounted for in IS research (Markus and Robey 1988; Hovorka et al. 2008; Gregor
and Hovorka 2011).

5.2 A conceptual map: Relationships between epistemic types
The design science epistemology is visualized through a conceptual map (figure 2)
of different knowledge types that are relevant in design science. The conceptual map
depicts knowledge types (boxes) and semantic relationships (arrows) between them.
Arrows do not describe sequences or processes. An arrow indicates a reading direction of the semantic relation as common in conceptual models. The basic structure
of this model follows the epistemic logic of the three stages with their corresponding
primary epistemic types (pre-design evaluative and explanatory knowledge; in-design
prospective knowledge; post-design prescriptive knowledge); cf. table 1. These primary
knowledge types are dependent on and built up from other more basic epistemic types.
In-design knowledge is key characterized as design hypothesis and post-design knowledge
as design principle. These concepts will be further elaborated below.
Explanatory knowledge plays important roles in all three stages. The roles are however differing which will be shown below. Explanatory knowledge is built from the two
parts in the clause; the cause-part and the effect-part. Certain categorized phenomena
are related causally through these explanatory clauses. Each part can be said to comprise
a description of some phenomenon. Phenomena can be 1) objects or processes and 2)
different properties of them. This can be seen to be a kind of realist ontology (Evermann
and Wand 2005), however, expanded beyond plain physical objects to include social/
institutional objects (Searle 1995; March and Allen 2014). There can be institutional
objects talked about such as applications and decisions (following the social welfare
case from above). Explanatory knowledge is built up from descriptive knowledge about
the world (figure 2). Such descriptive knowledge is here, following the realist ontology
mentioned, differentiated into 1) knowledge that identifies and categorizes objects or
processes (categorial knowledge) and 2) knowledge of attributive kind, i.e.,characterizing objects/processes by stating properties of them. This fundamental division into
objects, processes, and properties is directly reflected in language through the use of
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Pre-design
knowledge:
Background
knowledge

In-design
knowledge:
Design
hypothesis

Is ground for

Can be

Can support
formative
evaluation of

Evaluative
knowledge

Is

Prospective
knowledge
(possibility)

Prescriptive
knowledge
(rule)

Is
hypothetical

Appreciative
knowledge
(strength)

Is built
from

Post-design
knowledge:
Design
principle

Is

Can be

Critical
knowledge
(problem)

May be
transformed
to

Depends
on

Normative
knowledge
(goal)

Is (through
summative
evaluation)
validated

Depends Means-to-end
on
knowledge

Is (when
effect=goal)

Can be
Explanatory
knowledge
(cause-to-effect)

Is built from
Categorial
knowledge
(objects,
processes)

Is
related
to

Attributive
knowledge
(property)

Figure 2. Conceptual map: Epistemic types of design science knowledge

nouns, verbs, and adjectives (Wittgenstein 1958). It is far beyond the scope of this paper to dig further into an appropriate socio-technical ontology for IS design science; cf.
Goldkuhl, (2002; 2019) for more elaborate distinctions. Only some elementary constituents of a socio-technical world are described here as fundamental building blocks
for explanatory statements (see above and below).
In the pre-design stage, the focus is on the current practice situation. Evaluations are
made partially based on explanatory cause-to-effect descriptions of the current situation.
As described in the empirical case, there can be evaluative statements about problems
(i.e.,critical knowledge) and about strengths (i.e.,appreciative knowledge). Such knowledge will usually depend on normative knowledge (values/goals) as a means to articulate
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why something is considered negative or positive. Normative knowledge is necessary in
order to detect any deviation between current situation and desired situation. As part
of the pre-design background knowledge, there can also be explanatory knowledge of
abstract character as selected kernel theories from the scholarly knowledge base.
Explanatory knowledge is also used in the in-design and post-design stages but in
another shape. Here, the cause-to-effect clause is transformed into a means-to-end clause
(Goldkuhl 2004). Means-to-end clauses are prescriptive because the end is desired.
However, in design science it should be important to differentiate between 1) hypothetical means-to-end clauses occurring during design as a kind of prospective knowledge,
describing hypothetical and desirable possibilities however not yet finalized (in-design
knowledge) and 2) validated means-to-end clauses that are justified through observations
of use-situations (post-design knowledge). The latter will give rise to proper prescriptions, i.e.,advising certain means to instantiate in order to reach certain desired states
(i.e.,ends). A means-to-end clause as in-design knowledge is characterized as a design
hypothesis since it describes an anticipated artifact property and its relationships to use
situations. A means-to-end clause as post-design knowledge is characterized as a design
principle since it expresses prescriptive knowledge of an artifact property that may contribute to a desired use situation.
Prospective knowledge (belonging to in-design knowledge) is thus considered to be
hypothetical means-to-end knowledge. This may comprise ideas about artifact properties (i.e.,means) and how such properties may contribute to a desired practice situation
(i.e.,end). Prescriptive knowledge (belonging to post-design knowledge) is thus considered to be validated means-to-end knowledge. It is, however, important to add that
there will probably be a gradual shift from the prospective in-design knowledge to the
prescriptive post-design knowledge. Different projected design ideas may be visualized
in models and later instantiated in prototypes more or less advanced. During an iterative use of models and prototypes, design ideas are gradually shaped and also given
more credibility. Ideas and possibilities are becoming real through building, testing and
evaluating. Formative evaluation efforts during the design phase may contribute with
evaluative knowledge to a continual refinement of the design.
In order for post-design knowledge to reach the level of prescriptive design theories
(Walls et al. 1992; Gregor and Jones 2007) there needs to be empirical evaluations of
artifact use situations. Results from such post-evaluations can be abstractions of empirical data in the form of explanatory cause-to-effect clauses. These explanations can
be transformed into prescriptive means-to-end clauses (Goldkuhl 2004; Kuechler and
Vaishnavi 2012). This means that prescriptive means-to-end knowledge will build on
evaluative knowledge of testing and using an artifact. Prescriptive post-design knowl-
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edge is seen as a transformation of such post-evaluative knowledge. It will be a result of
a summative evaluation of artifact use.
As can be seen from above, evaluation will occur at different stages of a design science process, which also has been noted by several scholars (e.g.,Sonnenberg and vom
Brocke 2012; Baskerville et al. 2015). Evaluation can be performed following different
strategies (how), on different evaluation objects (what) and aiming for different kinds
of knowledge (why). A summary related to DSE can be found in table 4.
Knowledge
stage
Pre-design

HOW: Evaluation
type (strategy)

Empirical pre-

WHAT: Evaluation
object

Current practice

evaluation
In-design

WHY: Evaluation purpose
(epistemological orientation)

Establish a diagnosis background
for design (explanations, values)

Formative evaluation

Emergent design ideas

Improvement of design ideas/

during design

described in models and

hypotheses (prospective

prototypes

knowledge)

Post-

Summative empirical

Use of designed artifact in

Validation of design principles

design

evaluation

practice

(prescriptions)

Table 4. Different kinds of evaluation in design science studies

5.3 Design principles as outcomes from design science studies
Before post-design knowledge can be claimed to have reached the level of a proper design theory such knowledge can be expressed as design principles (Gregor and Hevner
2013) possibly in a nascent design theory. A design principle, according to Sein et al.
(2011) and discussed in section 3.3 above, expresses some property of an artifact and
it can be related to desired states in the practice context. This follows a means-to-end
pattern. The structured relationships between different artifact properties and practice
goals, as described in figure 1 of the design case above, seem to equate such a design
principle of Sein et al. (2011). When using a proposed terminology of artifact properties and practice goals, there is no need to use any terminology of meta-requirements
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and meta-designs as in Walls et al. (1992). This proposed approach also sharpens what
is a feature of the artifact and what is an effect of using such an artifact-feature.
The basic means-to-end clause in IS design science (following the examples from the
empirical case) has the following basic structure:
• Means: functional and external property of the IT artifact
• End: desired workpractice situation (i.e.,some desired fundamental value)
There can also be sub-means such as conditional artifact properties (cf. figure 1). The
external artifact properties are dependent on such conditional properties. It is important to acknowledge that the means are, not only artifacts as such, but specific properties
of artifacts. Such knowledge is attributive knowledge, i.e.,an expression of some specific
property of an object (in this case an IT artifact). This can be exemplified with ‘client
information is immediately exposed’ as a functional property of the focused IT artifact.
Ends (goals) are situations in practices where some desirable feature is emphasized in
such a situation (e.g.,correct, efficient, available, protected). A feature is of course not
just a feature; it is a property of something. This can be exemplified by ‘Correct decisions on social welfare allowances’, where ‘correct’ is an attribute of the object ‘decision
on social welfare allowances’.
As stated above, a design principle from a DS study may typically consist of such
a means-to-end clause; i.e.,a property of an IT artifact may contribute to a desired
practice situation. Figure 3 illustrates the structure of design principles including both
conditional and external artifact properties. The figure also illustrates that such subSub-means

to

means

to

end

Conditional
artifact
property

External
artifact
property

Desired
practice
situation

Categorial &
attributive
knowledege

Categorial &
attributive
knowledege

Categorial &
normative/
attributive
knowledege

Evaluative/appreciative cause-to-effect knowledge

Figure 3. Structure and dependencies of a design principle as an outcome from a design science
study
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means/means are constituted by categorial and attributive knowledge: IT artifact (as
category) with certain properties (as attributes). The end, as a desired practice situation, is constituted by such categorial and attributive knowledge with the important
addition that the attribute is considered as something valuable; i.e.,a kind of normative
knowledge. The design principle should not be a mere design hypothesis (as prospective
knowledge), but it should be the result of some empirical and evaluative study. In figure
3, this is illustrated, by stating that a design principle is dependent on evaluative causeto-effect knowledge. This type of evaluative knowledge should be seen as appreciative
since it emphasizes positive aspects of practices and IT artifacts.
It should be noted that conceptualizing knowledge in means-to-end chains is usually a matter of relative characterization. Something that is considered a means, can also
be considered as an end in relation to its sub-means. To exemplify, a functional property
of an IT artifact that is instrumental (i.e.,a means) in relation to desired practice situation, can also be considered as an objective for design, i.e.,in this case an intermediate
goal that is dependent on different sub-means. This implies that an artifact property can
be considered a means or an end depending on its role in means-to-end clauses.

5.4 Knowledge grounding
The conceptual map in figure 2 uses different epistemic types and clarifies the relationships between them. As can be seen from the clauses and examples in table 3, these different knowledge types have different sentence forms. This means also that these knowledge types need different grounding principles following Habermas (1984) as stated
above (section 2.2) when introducing the notion of epistemic type. The principle ways
of grounding these different epistemic types are shown in table 5. Some examples of
these groundings are explicated here. The two types of evaluative knowledge (problems,
strengths) need to be descriptively correct; i.e.,they should be considered veracious. The
specific evaluative type (problem vs. strength) needs to be justified argumentatively.
Something that is claimed to be a problem needs to be motivated as something that is
deemed negative in the practice. Something that is claimed to be a strength needs to be
motivated as something that is deemed positive in the practice. In table 5, there are also
references to literature for these different epistemic types; i.e.,this table functions also as
a kind of theoretical grounding of the different epistemic types.
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Type of
Knowledge

Way of grounding

Theoretical basis

Evaluative

Descriptive correspondence and

knowledge

assessment motivation

Dewey (1938); House and Howe (1999)

Critical

Descriptive correspondence and

knowledge

problem motivation

Appreciative

Descriptive correspondence and

knowledge

strength motivation

Normative

Motivated volition

House and Howe (1999); Rescher (2000)

Explanatory

Descriptive correspondence and

Reynolds (1971); Goldkuhl (2004); Gregor

knowledge

adequate abstraction

(2006)

Prospective

Innovativeness and valuable to explore

Dewey (1938); Lubart (2000)

Appropriateness in action

Rescher (2000); Goldkuhl (2004); Gregor

Dewey (1938); Rittel and Webber (1973)

Ludema et al. (2001)

knowledge

knowledge
Prescriptive
knowledge
Categorial

(2006)
Existence and proper abstraction

Searle (1969); Strauss and Corbin (1998);

knowledge

Evermann and Wand (2005); Gregor
(2006)

Attributive

Existence and proper characterization

knowledge

Searle (1969); Strauss and Corbin (1998);
Evermann and Wand (2005)

Table 5. Different epistemic types in design science described through ways of grounding and
theoretical basis (literature references)

As described above, in design science there are differentiations made 1) between situational problems and abstract classes of problems and 2) between specific designs and
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abstract classes of solutions (e.g.,Lee et al. 2011; Sein et al. 2011; Gregor and Hevner
2013). How is the presented design science epistemology related to this dichotomy? A
proper design science study should alternate in a constructive and generative manner
between a situational design focus and an abstract theorizing orientation. This means
that all epistemic types can be expressed in 1) a specific and situational manner aiming
for a specific artifact design and in 2) a de-contextualized and abstract manner aiming
for design principles and design theory.

6 Discussion and conclusions
6.1 Utilizing design science epistemology
How can this knowledge of DSE be used in research processes and publications from
such research? The phasing of design science described in this paper is important to
acknowledge; i.e.,the stages of pre-design, in-design and post-design. There are different primary epistemic types associated with these different stages; background evaluative and explanatory knowledge in pre-design, prospective means-to-end knowledge in
in-design, and prescriptive means-to-end knowledge in post-design. The design science
scholar needs to be well aware of these different epistemic types and address each of
them in fitted ways. These different primary epistemic types rely also on supportive
knowledge of other epistemic types, which can be seen in the conceptual map (figure
2) and also in textual descriptions above (especially section 5). The design science epistemology contributes useful knowledge of relationships between different epistemic
types in such a research process. The epistemological classification can be used as a
complement to existing process models in design science, such as Peffers et al. (2007)
and Kuechler and Vaishnavi (2012)/Vaishnavi and Kuechler (2015). In table 6, these
two process models have been mapped together with identified knowledge types associated with each process stage. Through a close reading of these publications, different
knowledge types have been identified and related to each process stage in table 6. A
fourth column, in this table, contains identified epistemic types from the presented
DSE. This can be compared with the knowledge types in the two DS process models
(columns two and three). The epistemological classification of DSE in this paper has a
more comprehensive epistemic content than the two established process models.
In the two process models, there is an emphasis (in pre-design) on identification
of problems. The DS epistemology adds evaluative strength knowledge to this. An appreciative inquiry is important in order to identify not yet exploited opportunities and
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Stages following
Kuechler and
Vaishnavi (knowledge types)

Knowledge
stage

Stages following Peffers et
al. (knowledge types)

Pre-design

Problem identification and

Awareness of problem

Evaluative/explanatory

motivation (problems, value

(problems)

situational knowledge

motivation)

Knowledge types
DSE

(problems, strengths)
Normative knowledge
Explanatory abstract
knowledge

In-design

Define the objectives for a

Suggestion

Prospective knowledge

solution

(kernel theory, design

(design hypotheses =

(objectives)

ideas)

means-to-end)

Design and development

Development

Normative knowledge

(functional specification)

Evaluative formative
knowledge

Post-design

Demonstration (knowledge

Demonstration

Prescriptive knowledge

for artifact use).

(knowledge for artifact

(design principles =

Evaluation (knowledge of

use)

means-to-end)

artifact use)

Evaluation

Evaluative/explanatory

Communication (relevant

(knowledge of artifact

knowledge of artifact

aspects of DS study)

use)

use

Communication

Normative knowledge

(relevant aspects of DS
study)

Table 6. Knowledge types in design science process models

practice traits that should be sustained in a change process. Glimpses of normative
knowledge in pre-design can be found in Peffers et al (2007): “Define the specific research problem and justify the value of a solution” (ibid. p. 52; my emphasis). To this,
one must add the importance to articulate and apply normative knowledge for a proper
evaluation of current situation. An empirical evaluation of current situation is in DSE
also paralleled by theoretical inquiries into the knowledge base of background explan-
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atory theories to reach an adequate theoretical grounding of design proposals. This is
also emphasized by Kuechler and Vaishnavi (2012) but in their process model placed in
direct relation to in-design (the suggestion stage).
Ideational knowledge in the in-design stage is emphasized by Vaishnavi and Kuechler
(2015) in a separate suggestion sub-stage. Peffers et al. (2007) have clarification of objectives (i.e.,normative knowledge) in a preceding sub-stage before designing. In addition to these knowledge types, DSE emphasizes prospective knowledge as an explicit
clarification of means-to-end, i.e.,functional relationships between artifact properties
and desired practice situations. DSE acknowledges also formative evaluations of design
hypotheses that may occur in different degrees of manifestation.
In the post-design stage, both referenced process models acknowledge the need for
evaluation of artifact use. Kuechler and Vaishnavi (2012) are explicit about explanatory/prescriptive design theory as a primary outcome from DS. In DSE, the essential
outcome from post-design is seen as design principle as a transformation and validation
of design hypothesis from in-design.
Scholars that follow any of these two established DS process models can thus add
some more epistemological reflection and articulation in different stages (table 5). The
presented DS epistemology does not prescribe an exhaustive use of epistemic types in
all DS studies. It contains a map with different epistemic types and relationships between them. There will always be an open issue in each DS endeavor how ambitious the
epistemological development should be conducted.
The presented design science epistemology could also influence the way a DS study
is reported in a scholarly publication. Gregor and Hevner (2013) have made a thorough
proposal for how to structure a design science publication. They present a publication schema with seven sections (summarized below in table 7; first column) and they
comment similarities with and differences to an ordinary empirical paper. In general,
the presented DS epistemology fits well into their publication schema. However, some
amendments are possible to make to their publication schema if one follows the structure, contents, and insights of DSE more faithfully. A slightly modified publication
schema is suggested in table 7 (second column). The two publication schemas are descriptively compared in table 7 and also in the text below. Table 7 contains some key
characteristics in parentheses for each schema and section. These characterizations are
formulated in ways compliant to the terminologies of each approach. This means that
in some cases the differences are more terminological than conceptual.
Pre-design, through evaluative knowledge of problems and strengths in current
practices, is emphasized in DSE. Gregor and Hevner (2013) include such knowledge in
the introductory section. In the DSE variant, this knowledge is considered as vital for
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Gregor and Hevner publication schema

DSE publication schema

1. Introduction (problem definition and

1. Introduction (general background and

significance; purpose and scope of artifact;

purpose of research)

research objectives)
2. Diagnostic base (pre-design evaluative
knowledge with explicit normative reflection)
2. Literature review (extant descriptive and

3. Literature review (explanatory knowledge

prescriptive knowledge)

from knowledge base)

3. Method (applied research approach)

4. Method (emphasizing the epistemic logic)

4. Artifact description (description of artifact;

5. Design process (emergence of design

possibly design search/development process)

hypotheses; formative evaluation in in-design)
6. Artifact description (conditional and external
properties of artifact)

5. Evaluation (criteria for and result from

7. Post-evaluation (evaluative knowledge

evaluation)

with relationships between artifact properties
and practice situation; founded in normative
knowledge)

6. Discussion (interpretation of results; in

8. Design principles (explication of prescriptive

some cases, extraction of design principles;

means-to-end knowledge)

implications of results; summary)
7. Conclusions (important findings)

9. Concluding discussion (implications;
summary)

Table 7. Design science publication schemas: a comparison

the DS process and it has therefore been given a separate section (2). There is a section 4
in Gregor and Hevner (2013) containing artifact description. They describe the content
of this section to “include … perhaps, the design search (development) process that
led to the discovery of the artifact design” (ibid. p. 350). In DSE, the in-design stage is
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considered as vital and hence also the reporting of this knowledge process. Therefore,
the optional remark by Gregor and Hevner (“included ... perhaps”) (2013) is considered as too weak. This in-design part of the DS process is given a separate section in
the DSE schema: “Section 4 Design process”. The focus should be on the emergence
of design hypotheses based on alternations between building and formative evaluation.
This can be equated with the view of explicating a theory through the description of
the theorizing process of interim struggles with intermediate results (Weick 1995). Design principles (as means-to-end knowledge) are considered in DSE as a key outcome
from a design science study. It is an outcome from the post-design stage and it builds
upon knowledge from the two previous stages. In the DSE schema, this prescriptive
knowledge has a more prominent place in a separate section (8 Design principles). In
the Gregor and Hevner (2013) schema, presentation of design principles was included
as one part in the Discussions section (6). Other parts (such as implications) in this
Discussions section have (in DSE schema proposal) been moved to the last section (9
Concluding discussion). As Gregor and Hevner (2013, p. 350-351) state “there is often
difficulty representing the design of a complex artifact in the space that is allowed in
a journal”. The Gregor and Hevner (2013) publication schema is ambitious, and the
DSE schema can be considered as even more ambitious. This points to dividing the
reporting into several papers. There exist several possible strategies for dividing a DS
study into several papers. One possibility is slicing the artifact into different clusters
of artifact properties. Each such property cluster can be described in a comprehensive
way concerning pre-design, in-design and post-design following either of the two publication schemas (table 7). Another publication strategy is to divide the publications
along with the DS staging. For example, a three-paper presentation could consist of:
1) one paper with a focus on pre-design knowledge (background evaluations) including
sketchy design proposals (prospective in-design knowledge) as potential responses to
identified problems; and 2) one paper with in-depth descriptions of artifact properties
(in-design knowledge) with hypothetical use-effects as desired ends (design hypotheses)
including references to background knowledge motivating the suggested designs; and
3) one paper with focus on prescriptive post-design knowledge (design principles), where
validations of proposed design properties are presented.
The suggestions above are concerned with concrete aspects of DS research (management of DS process and publications). The DS epistemology can also be used to stimulate further philosophical reflection on DS in IS. This paper has taken a pragmatist
stance in its inquiry and how to conceptualize different epistemic types. There are other
possible angles for philosophical reflections as stated by other scholars; e.g.,interpretivism (Niehaves 2007) and critical realism (Carlsson 2010).
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6.2 Concluding remarks
This paper has, through an empirically informed epistemological inquiry, shown the diversity of design science epistemology. There is a rich epistemological landscape to address
in design science and there is a great need for DS scholars to be well aware of different
epistemic types and the respective ways of how to express and ground such differing
knowledge. This paper has contributed a clarification of a design science epistemology
with different epistemic types related to different stages of the design science process.
Different epistemic types have been exemplified through an empirical case. Ways to express knowledge types have been proposed in principal clauses. Ways of grounding have
been clarified for each epistemic type. This design science epistemology, provides DS
scholars with instruments 1) to plan the DS knowledge progression process, 2) to characterize different knowledge items epistemologically (i.e.,to assign each to an epistemic
type), 3) which helps scholars to the find suitable ways for grounding this knowledge
and to report them properly.
In a simplified differentiation between behavioral science and design science, the
former is associated with truth of what-is and the latter with utility and prescriptions
for what-to-be. Such a differentiation overlooks the overlaps and similarities between
behavioral science and design science. In order to create new artifacts and prescriptive
knowledge for the design of artifacts, there is a need to acknowledge the artifacts and
the corresponding new prescriptive knowledge as a response to problematic situations
of what-is. Truthful knowledge about current situations (what-is) is indispensable in
research through design. Evaluative and explanatory knowledge is a necessary starting
point of design science studies. Evaluative and explanatory knowledge is also a necessary end point of design science endeavors since it is through such knowledge that
design principles and prescriptions within a design theory are grounded.
This paper has also added to the discourse on what makes a design science study,
with its focus on designing artifacts, to a scientific endeavor. Previously, arguments have
been stated that it is the degree of innovation and novelty that is significant (Hevner
et al. 2004) or the rigor in the development process (Iivari 2007). My main argument
is that a design science study should produce artifacts and grounded knowledge connected to those artifacts. If no grounded knowledge is produced, it is hard to claim the
study to be scientific. This makes us turn to epistemology and argumentative rationality (Habermas 1984; Goldkuhl 2004) as foundations for a design science process. A
key characteristic in DSE is the inherent knowledge progression from evaluative background knowledge to design hypotheses and design principles.
What is next for this design science epistemology, i.e.,what about future research?
The obvious and primary use and influence are to apply it as a guide for developing,
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validating and expressing different types of knowledge in DS studies and to report
about experiences from such use. The hope that follows with this paper is to get DS
scholars better prepared to navigate in the complex epistemological landscape of DS
and to focus on those knowledge types that are important in their DS endeavors in
order to produce impactful design science studies. This DS epistemology might also be
used as an instrument for investigating design science studies/publications in retrospect
in order to push existing DS knowledge further. Such different uses may inform further
development of this design science epistemology. A more radical future research task
would be to use the developed design science epistemology as a foundation for a more
thorough re-conceptualization of design science and its different sub-activities such as
problem articulation, design thinking, artifact creation, evaluation, data generation,
and theorizing.
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